Against the Luddites
Luddism does not deserve to be rehabilitated. It was a medieval throwback, reactionary and primitive, a pre-Marxist labor convulsion closer in spirit to the Khmer Rouge’s fantasies of agrarian restoration than to the universalist solidarity of Eugene Debs. The contemporary effort to recast the Luddites as thoughtful critics of technology gives modern anxieties about AI a historical pedigree they do not deserve. The movement was a violent defense of guild privilege, male supremacy, and craft hierarchy against the leveling forces of industrial modernity. They could have fought for equality and justice; they chose instead to fight to remain the petty bosses of their own towns rather than cede that authority to the owners of factories.
The rehabilitation of Luddism is a vice signal. Anyone genuinely concerned with workers’ dignity has Marx, Debs, and Martin Luther King to hand, organizers who championed equality across lines of skill, race, and gender. The choice to reach past all of them for a movement of guild enforcers who beat women in the streets is made because of the violence and reaction, not despite it.
An Elite Movement
The Luddites did not represent the working class. Cambridge historian Richard Jones examined oral testimonies, trial documents, Parliamentary papers, and Home Office reports. He concluded that Luddism was “far from a genuinely pan-working class movement.” The Luddites were “a relatively ‘elite’ group, whose role had traditionally been protected by legislation regulating the supply and conduct of labour.” In an industry employing a million people, the movement never exceeded a couple of thousand. Jones put it bluntly: “these were not downtrodden working class labourers. The Luddites were elite craftspeople.”1
The Yorkshire croppers, the vanguard of Luddism in the West Riding, had to complete seven-year apprenticeships before they could practice their trade. After seven years, Jones notes, “they tended to feel that they were owed a living.” For the genuinely unskilled and dispossessed, displacement by machines was already old news; they had little reason to join a movement defending privileges they never possessed.
The Nottinghamshire framework-knitters ran the same racket. Among their core grievances was the employment of “colts,” workers who had not served the seven-year apprenticeship. They objected to “unapprenticed youths” and to the new wide frames, which produced cheaper goods that anyone could operate.2 Every Luddite complaint presupposed a closed guild system in which access to the trade was rationed by the incumbents.
The Exclusion of Women
The machines the Luddites smashed did something that, by any measure of human equality, should have been celebrated. As Daron Acemoglu has documented, they “replaced the scarce and expensive factors, the skilled artisans, by relatively cheap and abundant factors, unskilled manual labor of men, women, and children.”3 The Luddites treated this as an outrage.
Violence against women was endemic to the skilled textile trades, of which Luddism was the most dramatic expression. A petition from Glasgow cotton manufacturers, preserved in parliamentary records, states:
“In almost every department of the cotton spinning business, the labour of women would be equally efficient with that of men; yet in several of these departments, such measures of violence have been adopted by the combination, that the women who are willing to be employed, and who are anxious by being employed to earn the bread of their families, have been driven from their situations by violence.”4
When the firm of James Dunlop and Sons built spinning machines small enough to be operated by women and employed female spinners, the women “were waylaid and attacked, in going to, and returning from their work; the houses in which they resided, were broken open in the night. The women themselves were cruelly beaten and abused; and the mother of one of them killed.” The firm was forced to dismiss all female spinners and hire only men.
In 1810, the Calton association of weavers formally resolved “that no new female apprentices could be taken except from the weaver’s own families.” In 1833, male cotton spinners struck against female spinners at Dennistoun’s mill in Calton, “using violent means to drive them from the workplace.”5
A nationwide meeting of spinners in 1829 passed a resolution restricting the trade to “the son, brother, or orphan nephew of spinners, and the poor relations of the proprietors of the mills,” excluding women entirely. A demand that only your sons and nephews be permitted to practice the trade is an inheritance claim, not a workers’ demand, closer in spirit to the family that passes down ownership of a car dealership than to any form of labor solidarity. As Marianna Valverde has observed, “the spinners’ masculinity and craft were completely intertwined.”6
The Luddite cause was inseparable from the cause of male monopoly over skilled labor. To rehabilitate Luddism without confronting this is to celebrate a movement that beat women in the streets for daring to earn a living.
Marx and Engels Saw Through It
Marx and Engels understood Luddism as primitive, misdirected resistance, a stage to be transcended, not celebrated.
In the Communist Manifesto (1848), Marx and Engels placed machine-breaking at the very earliest, most confused stage of proletarian development. Workers at this stage “direct their attacks not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their labour, they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek to restore by force the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages.” They remain “an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country, and broken up by their mutual competition.”7
The phrase to dwell on is the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages. Marx saw the Luddites as men trying to restore feudal craft privileges by force, a reactionary project dressed up as resistance.
Engels went further. In The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845), he argued that pre-industrial craft workers “were not human beings; they were merely toiling machines in the service of the few aristocrats who had guided history down to that time.” The industrial revolution, for all its horrors, stripped away this comfortable illusion, “forcing them to think and demand a position worthy of men.”8 The order the Luddites wanted to restore was itself a form of servitude, one whose bars were harder to see.
In Capital, Vol. 1, Marx made the critique structural. “It took both time and experience before workers learnt to distinguish between machinery and its employment by capital, and therefore to transfer their attacks from the material instruments of production to the form of society which utilises those instruments.” The Luddites had not learned this lesson. They attacked the machine and left the system untouched.
Elsewhere in the same chapter, Marx was explicit: the Luddite phase had to be superseded. The destruction of machinery was the first instinctive reaction of workers who had not grasped that their enemy was the social relation wielding the machine. Trade unions and political organization represented the maturation that machine-breaking could never achieve: workers learning to target the system rather than its tools.9
Even Hobsbawm, the most sympathetic Marxist to touch the subject, conceded the point. “Collective bargaining by riot” is a generous description of Luddite machine-wrecking, but bargaining by riot is pre-political by definition.10
Restoration, Never Revolution
The Luddites fought to preserve a hierarchy that benefited them, a hierarchy built on seven-year apprenticeships, guild monopolies, the exclusion of women, and the exclusion of the unskilled. They demanded the restoration of a vanishing past.
The croppers wanted Parliament to ban machines that had existed since the sixteenth century and to enforce the Statute of Artificers (1563), which mandated seven-year apprenticeships and restricted entry to trades. Parliament repealed the Statute in 1814, two years after the height of Luddism; even the Tory government of the era recognized it as obsolete. The framework-knitters invoked the authority of the Company of Framework Knitters, a guild body chartered in 1657, to justify their demands. The entire framework was pre-modern: traditional wages, access, and hierarchy.
We have seen what happens when those who yearn for a return to the past are given power. When the Khmer Rouge seized Cambodia in 1975, they emptied the cities and drove the population into the rice fields in pursuit of an agrarian Year Zero. The scale of violence is incomparable to anything the Luddites had the power to do, but the ideological shape is the same. It is the simple call to smash the instruments of modernity, return to a simpler, purer social order. The Luddites wanted to restore the medieval craftsman; the Khmer Rouge wanted to restore the agrarian peasant. Both treated the people empowered by modernization as threats to be suppressed. The reactionary romanticism and the hatred of the leveling effects of new productive forces are the same impulse.
Eugene Debs, by contrast, never demanded the restoration of the artisan’s workshop. He organized across skill, gender, and racial lines. The IWW’s founding convention in 1905 identified the craft union as the central obstacle to working-class solidarity. The AFL’s craft unions were the direct organizational descendants of the guild mentality the Luddites had fought and killed to preserve: apprenticeship requirements, restricted entry, jealous guarding of trade boundaries.11 The IWW set out to organize all workers regardless of skill, trade, race, or sex. Its founding was an explicit repudiation of everything the Luddites stood for.
We can either destroy the means of production or seize them, and we cannot do both.
Conclusion
The rehabilitation of the Luddites is an intellectual project that succeeds only by omission. It requires ignoring who the Luddites were (a small elite of privileged male artisans), what they wanted (the restoration of guild monopolies), and what they did (beat women, burned factories, and murdered a mill owner). It requires ignoring that Marx and Engels, the tradition’s own founders, saw Luddism as precisely the kind of confused, backward-looking, pre-political rebellion that had to be overcome before a genuine workers’ movement could emerge.
If automation concentrates wealth and displaces workers, the answer is to change who owns the machines and how their gains are distributed, not to smash them. Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, in Inventing the Future (2015), reject the anti-technology nostalgia they call “folk politics” and argue for universal basic income, a shorter work week, and collective ownership of automated production.12 Aaron Bastani’s Fully Automated Luxury Communism (2019) goes further: automation, renewable energy, and synthetic biology make a post-scarcity world materially possible, if their fruits are collectively owned rather than privately hoarded.13 Both ask who should own the future, not whether the future should be allowed to arrive.
The legitimate grievance in Luddism, that workers deserve a say in how technology reshapes their conditions, does not need the Luddites as its vessel. That idea has better champions.
Richard Jones, research on the Luddite bicentenary, University of Cambridge. ”Rage against the machine.”
Kevin Binfield, ed., Writings of the Luddites (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004). Binfield’s introduction documents the framework-knitters’ grievances, including the employment of “colts” (unapprenticed workers) and the use of wide frames. The croppers’ campaign to enforce obsolescent apprenticeship legislation is documented in Adrian Randall, Before the Luddites: Custom, Community, and Machinery in the English Woollen Industry, 1776–1809 (Cambridge University Press, 1991). See also the Encyclopedia.com entry on Luddites.
Daron Acemoglu, ”Technology and Inequality,” NBER Reporter, 2003. See also Kevin H. O’Rourke, Ahmed S. Rahman, and Alan M. Taylor, ”Luddites, the Industrial Revolution, and the Demographic Transition,” Journal of Economic Growth 18, no. 4 (2013): 373–409.
The Calton weavers’ 1810 resolution barring female apprentices and the 1833 violent strike against female spinners are documented in the historical record of Calton weavers, drawing on Norman Murray, The Scottish Handloom Weavers, 1790–1850: A Social History (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1978). For the broader pattern of male textile workers’ violent exclusion of women, see Marianna Valverde, “Giving the Female a Domestic Turn: the Social, Legal and Moral Regulation of Women’s Work in British Cotton Mills, 1820–1850,” Journal of Social History 21, no. 4 (1988): 619–634.
“How 19th-Century Cotton Mills Influenced Workplace Gender Roles,” JSTOR Daily. daily.jstor.org
Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto (1848), Chapter 1. marxists.org
Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845), Introduction. Available via marxists.org.
Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, Chapter 15, Section 5 (”The Strife Between Workman and Machine”). Quotations are from the Fowkes translation (Penguin Classics, pp. 554–555). The chapter is available in the Moore and Aveling translation via marxists.org.
E. J. Hobsbawm, ”The Machine Breakers,” Past & Present, Vol. 1, No. 1 (February 1952), pp. 57–70. Hobsbawm coined “collective bargaining by riot” in this article and acknowledged that such movements relied on “the natural protection of small numbers and scarce apprenticed skills, which might be safeguarded by restricted entry to the market and strong hiring monopolies.” The Midlands Luddites’ invocation of the Company of Framework Knitters is documented in Kevin Binfield, ed., Writings of the Luddites (Johns Hopkins, 2004).
The IWW Preamble, adopted at the founding convention in Chicago, June 27–July 8, 1905, declared that craft divisions “foster a state of affairs which allows one set of workers to be pitted against another set of workers in the same industry.” The Preamble and convention proceedings are available via iww.org.
Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work (London: Verso, 2015). Srnicek and Williams coined “folk politics” to describe the left’s retreat into localism, direct action, and anti-technology sentiment, arguing that these impulses cede the future to capital.
Aaron Bastani, Fully Automated Luxury Communism: A Manifesto (London: Verso, 2019). Bastani argues that emerging technologies of abundance make post-scarcity achievable, provided the means of production are collectively owned.


It's important to consider how and why the left/acc project of ppl like Srineck failed to launch. Was it simply too early? Would the same strategy re-played now win "universal basic income, a shorter work week, and collective ownership of automated production?" I'm not sure. We should be attentive to why the Promethean Left has not yet emerged and what political actions/coalitions could cause one to come into existence.
One might notice the success of economic populism among both high-education and low-income voters. The best example for this is the election of Zohran Mamdani who won not only college graduates in Bushwick but also working class families across the Bronx. This dynamic holds across most polling data, and we could imagine it intensifying as AI increases a recognition of downward mobility amount college educated voters. The affordability crisis provides a north star for a "good governance" Left that seeks to ensure egalitarian prosperity by any means necessary. If any political coalition could ensure the redistribution of automated profit against private interests and establishment political power, it would be this one.
This is why, I argue, the American Left must take the ownership of AI, not just its regulation, as one of its central demands. (https://onethousandmeans.substack.com/p/the-left-must-plan-for-ai?utm_campaign=post-expanded-share&utm_medium=web). We are beginning to see a serious concern for the capabilities of AI from people like Sen. Sanders and Rep. Cortes (https://onethousandmeans.substack.com/p/sanders-sounds-the-alarm-on-ai?utm_campaign=post-expanded-share&utm_medium=web), but we remain in a language of moratorium as a way to take existing AI concerns and plug it into a universalist project. While the Luddite project is maintenance of localist status quo, the project of the Left is to convert localism into an ambitious and global egalitarianism. It is my view that it might be a disaster if the Left fails to perform such a conversion before the 2028 election.
On the other hand, technocrats who care about this problem need to recognize the actual political coalitions that exist in America who could achieve their aims. Every AI Safety researcher agrees that "Concentration of Power" is a key risk area, yet they insist that AI Safety must remain apolitical. Perhaps this is true across other domains, but there is nothing apolitical about the concentration of power! Determining who controls what is--coarsely defined--the essential function of politics. How do you think the actually existing Republican Party would respond to an unprecedented possibility to concentrate power into the hands of their elites? The rose-colored worldview of apolitical technocracy has failed to recognize this threat across fields: housing wonks, clinical trial reform, etc. There is simply no alternative than a Left-collaboration for technocratic governance to be achieved against the will of rent-seeking and establishment interests.
For a Left that extends beyond the Luddites, a coalition between the existing Left and technocrats of all types must be built--identifying a common enemy in the Affordability Crisis. It is in pursuit of both economic growth and redistribution where we might build a coalition that has both the worldview and methods to deliver a positive vision of technological progress, which is critical in light of rapid improvements in artificial intelligence.
Some books that I learned a lot from when I was just starting high school in the 90s:
Toffler and Farrell's "Future Shock" was the reigning idea of my childhood, which was that people would be totally out of step with how things change and would find themselves in a constant state of adjustment instead of ever finding a story they're part of.
Winn Schwartau details in "Information Warfare" how the future of war will be about attack on civilian choke points, "soft kills" where you just disable critical things, and how attacking is easier than defending. I think the "battle space" as it were has now moved inside culture and further eroded people's attempts at life-giving mental niches.
David Frum's "Dead Right" basically says "hey, you decry the welfare state, but the welfare state is literally you and no one will ever say this because it's political suicide." We have witnessed generations of efforts to pick this particular lock ever since.